Pleading Paper

The defendants argue that the City’s red light camera system violates the City’s police power because the cameras were not installed at intersections selected to increase safety, but rather to raise revenue. The defendants have presented extensive evidence of the numbers of violations and the numbers of accidents at the various intersections selected to have red light cameras. From this they conclude that the intersections chosen were not those which had the most accidents caused by red light violations. The prosecution points out that all of the representatives of the City have stated their primary goal in installing red light cameras was to increase safety at the intersections where the cameras were installed and further to increase safety generally because of the deterrent and educational effect red light cameras have on all intersections.

The city manager, based on authority from the city council, directed the police to select intersections that had high accident volume. The police added the criterion of number of violations in addition to number of accidents. While this may have violated the direction from the city council, Vehicle Code 21455.5 does not require a specific city council resolution. Therefore, adding to the criterion set by the City does not equate to a violation of Vehicle Code section 21455.5.

Defendants argue that by putting violations over accidents, the City was putting revenue concerns over safety concerns. The testimony of the police officers was that each red light violation is a potential accident and, accordingly, a safety concern. Therefore, there is no basis for the conclusion that by emphasizing violations, safety concerns were not foremost. There is no requirement that the driver running the red light create an immediate safety hazard before a citation is issued. Thus, the criteria used in the selection process were reasonably related to promoting public safety.

B. The Data Used in the Selection Process

The defendants have cited several studies of red light cameras which question both their efficacy and safety. The defense has also criticized the study done by the City of Oxnard which indicated substantial reductions in accidents. The San Diego police reviewed the Oxnard study and obtained information from San Francisco about its experience with red light cameras. They received information that the cameras were effective in reducing accidents. Whether the information received is flawed is not the issue. The issue is whether, with the goal of safety, the installation of the red light cameras was a reasonable attempt to deal with the problem. Given the information provided to the police, the red light cameras were a reasonable way of reducing accidents.

The traffic engineering department has accurate and detailed information regarding accidents, including the direction the vehicles were going that caused the accidents. When this information is put into the police computers, that detail is lost so that when the police use their own computers to determine the number of accidents, they receive information that is not as precise. The police were able to determine accidents caused by running red lights in the vicinity of the intersections, but their information did not show the direction the vehicle was moving at the time of the accident. Therefore, defendants argue the information relied upon by the police was not rationally related to the problem. Since the information from traffic engineering is used by the police to input into the police computer, it is not clear why the police did not go back to the source to obtain more accurate and precise information. Nevertheless, the police did not do so and made decisions based, not on the best information, but rather secondary information.

Since the police did not use the best evidence available to them, the defendants argue that information used was merely to cover up the true goal of finding the intersections that would generate the most income. The Court does not believe that the police intentionally used faulty information and it is not clear that the person who compiled the information for the police was even aware that better information was available. Therefore, the actions of the police were not arbitrary, as the information they received was reasonably related to red light violations and accidents caused by running red lights, even if not the most precise data.

C. The Location of the Cameras

Defendants argue that the initial goal of placing two red light cameras in each council district shows that there was a political motivation rather than a safety motivation.

The spreading of the cameras among the council districts, while perhaps motivated politically, does not defeat the primary purpose of safety as the City believes that the red light cameras increase safety wherever they are located. One of the City’s witnesses believed that geographic dispersal would increase safety, as more drivers would be exposed to the cameras and they would have a greater deterrent effect. Thus, spreading the cameras among council districts is not arbitrary. Spreading the cameras around can be a subject for debate, but does not cause a constitutional defect. The sole issue is whether the action reasonably relates to a legitimate governmental purpose. Birkenfeld, supra at 159. Further, defendants cite no authority that requires that the cameras have to be located at the most dangerous intersections.

D. Participation by Lockheed Martin

The defendants argue that the process used to select intersections is fatally flawed because Lockheed Martin or its predecessor participated in the selection of the intersections. Further, since Lockheed listed criteria which were not part of the City’s criteria, e.g. length of the yellow light, the process was designed exclusively to create revenue.

Lockheed Martin had input into the selection process which was beneficial and necessary. Lockheed needed to evaluate the physical attributes of the location to determine if a camera could be used effectively. Lockheed suggested intersections which were subject to review and approval by the City. The ultimate decision for the location of the cameras was with the City. Lockheed’s participation in this process does not violate either Vehicle Code section 21455.5 or the constitution.

E. Consideration of Alternatives

In People v. Niebauer (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 1278, the defendant was convicted of driving with dark tinting material on the side windows of his truck in violation of Vehicle Code section 26708(a). While the constitutional issue is different, the appellate court’s response to defendant’s constitutional challenge is persuasive.

When a state statute regarding safety matters applies equally to interstate and intrastate commerce, the courts are generally reluctant to invalidate them even if they may have some impact on interstate commerce. (Citation omitted.) In Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines (1959) 359 U.S. 520, 524, the United States Supreme Court embellished this rule by stating: "These safety measures carry a strong presumption of validity when challenged in court. If there are alternative ways of solving a problem, we do not sit to determine which of them is best suited to achieve a valid state objective. (Emphasis added.) Id. at 1287.

Similarly, it is not for the Court to be concerned with alternatives. The stated objective is to increase safety by reducing broadside, or "T‑bone" accidents at street intersections. Even if to accomplish this goal there is an increase in rear-end accidents, it is not the Court’s role to determine if such a trade is good policy. There may be better ways to accomplish this goal, but as long as a legitimate governmental interest is being served, the Court should not intervene. As Mr. Mei, an associate traffic engineer for the City, pointed out, red light cameras are “a tool” in addition to all of the other engineering factors which can be used by the City to regulate safety at intersections.

F. The Effectiveness of Red light Cameras in San Diego

The prosecution and the defendants have each presented a conflicting analysis of the statistical data regarding the effectiveness of the red light cameras. Since a hindsight test is not the way to test constitutionality, the subsequent history has no relevance to whether or not the installation of the red light cameras was constitutional. Therefore, the subsequent history cannot and does not change the Court’s finding the selection of intersections was reasonably related to the goal of safety and was not arbitrary.

II.

YELLOW LIGHT DURATION

A. Yellow Light Duration as an Alternative

A major portion of the testimony and documentary evidence at this hearing was devoted to yellow-light times. In particular, the City’s decision to have uniform three-second yellow lights at left turns has been the subject of significant attack by the defendants. The City chose the three-second time based on a study of three intersections which showed that the average approach speed for a left-turn signal was 23 miles per hour. The City uses the Institute of Transportation Engineers (“ITE”) formula to determine yellow light duration. The ITE formula considers time and distance and the goal is to allow those who are unable to stop to proceed through the intersection while the light is yellow and to allow those who are farther away to stop in a sufficient period of time. Using this formula, 3.0 seconds was an appropriate yellow light duration. It is not the role of the Court to substitute its judgment for that of the traffic engineers. Whether short yellow lights create more violations, and thus create an appropriate (or inappropriate) location for the installation of a red light camera, is not clear from the record. With the exception of Mission Bay Drive and Grand Avenue where there was apparently a mistake (which has been corrected), there is no clear evidence of shortening yellow lights prior to the installation of red light cameras. Whether increasing yellow light times is a better method of reducing red light violations (as evidenced by the dramatic reduction of violations at Mission Bay and Grand after the yellow light was lengthened and some of the data in Exh. AAAA) is a matter for the legislature and the City, not the Court. See Birkenhead, supra at 159, “we must not confuse reasonableness, in this context, with wisdom.” Thus, there is nothing about the yellow light times that creates a constitutional defect.

The defendants contend that the yellow light time at some of the intersections may not comply with the ITE standards. Assuming defendants are correct, that would be a factor at trial to determine whether the defendant is guilty and is not a reason to invalidate the use of red light cameras at certain intersections.

B. The Testimony of Dr. Beck Regarding Yellow Light Duration

The defendants presented Dr. Neils Johannes Beck as their expert. Dr. Beck, although a very experienced engineer, has no training in traffic engineering. His sole background in the area of red light cameras and traffic intersections is the last eighteen months in which he has spent educating himself, in part based on his concerns after he received a citation generated by the red light camera system. Dr. Beck proposes that extending yellow light times could eliminate dilemma zones and reduce accidents caused by running red lights. Dr. Beck also disagrees with the ITE standards.

Dr. Beck’s approach is contradicted by those employees of the City who have spent their entire professional careers in the field of traffic engineering and by the experts at ITE who have created the standards. While it may be time for a fresh approach, and Dr. Beck’s approach does have a certain common-sense appeal, it is not for this court to determine the best way to regulate intersections.

Red light cameras are not activated until the light has been red for .5 seconds. Dr. Beck believes the red light camera delay of .5 seconds is too short, as only those who run the red light after it has been red for a longer period are likely to cause accidents. It is a crime to run a red light (Vehicle Code section 21453). A driver who runs the red light .5 seconds after it turns red is equally guilty in the eyes of the law as one who runs the red light after several seconds. Therefore, the choice of a .5 second delay does not make the implementation of the red light cameras unconstitutional.

In San Diego, the light is red for at least one second in both directions before one of the lights turns green. Dr. Beck believes the yellow lights were shortened when the one-second red light clear was added and this was a bad decision. Although the Court is not aware that such a “trade” took place, assuming the City made such decision, that does not create a constitutional defect in the way intersections are regulated. The one-second red light delay would seem to increase safety. (See Exhibit AAAA which indicates nearly 80 percent (80%) of red light entries occur in the first second after the light turns red.) The City’s engineers apparently concluded that the light turning red was even a greater incentive to have people stop than continuing the yellow light. It is not up to the court to try to second-guess this strategy.

III.

THE FLASH

Defendants argue that the flash increases the danger at the intersections. They point to complaints that have been received and one complaint in particular in which a motorist claimed to have swerved because of the flash. A former employee of Lockheed, Mr. Arnone, claims that the flash is excessively bright. The prosecution responds by pointing to the “test” run by Mr. Gwinn and Mr. Cooper from the City Attorney’s Office, who drove cars through the intersection and were not bothered by the flash. The Court is not persuaded by any of this testimony and does not believe that it can make a determination one way or the other. As there is no evidence of any accidents caused by the flash, the defendants have failed to show that there is an increased danger as a result of the flashes from the strobe lights. See People v. Niebauer, supra.

IV.

RIGHT TO PRIVACY

A. Access to DMV Records

Defendants argue that Lockheed is given access to Department of Motor Vehicle records in violation of defendants’ right to privacy. The Vehicle Code has a series of sections which provide for confidentiality and also provide for release of that information to law enforcement agencies or other government agencies. (See Veh. Code §§ 1808-1808.47, 1810-1810.7.) The Vehicle Code also allows for release to a person who has been issued a requestor code. (Veh. Code § 1810.2.) In this case, the San Diego Police Department applied to the DMV for a requestor code to be issued to Lockheed Martin (Exhibit 2). The uncontradicted testimony is that employees of Lockheed Martin executed the Department of Motor Vehicles’ employee security statement which requires that they agree to use the information only in their employment. (Exhibit 1.)

The procedure used by the police, combined with the employee’s security statement, gives sufficient protection to the otherwise confidential information and therefore there is no violation of the constitutional right of privacy.

B. Photos Sent to Registered Owners

The defendants argue that the constitutional right of privacy is violated when a citation and photograph are sent to the registered owner who is not the driver. The Court is not aware of any expectation of privacy when one is driving a motor vehicle on a public street. Merely sending a photo to the registered owner does not violate any right of privacy.

SUMMARY

The Court finds:

1. The selection of the intersections to install red-light cameras was a constitutional exercise of the City’s police power.

2. It is not the role of the Court to determine whether there are other alternatives, such as, lengthening yellow light durations to accomplish the goal of safety, and the existence of alternatives does not make the red-light camera system unconstitutional.

3. The defendants have failed to show that there is an increased danger as a result of the flashes from the strobe lights on the cameras.

4. The access Lockheed has to the Department of Motor Vehicle records does not violate the defendants’ right of privacy.

5. Sending photos of drivers to registered owners, who may not necessarily be the driver, does not violate the driver’s right of privacy.

. . . .

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Prosecution as Enabling Statutes are An Unconstitutional Application of the State’s Police Powers As Applied is denied.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: August ____ , 2001 _____________________________________

RONALD L. STYN

Judge of the Superior Court